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Abstract
We study the problem of policy repair for learning-based control poli-
cies in safety-critical settings. We consider an architecture where a high-
performance learning-based control policy (e.g. one trained as a neural
network) is paired with a model-based safety controller. The safety con-
troller is endowed with the abilities to predict whether the trained policy
will lead the system to an unsafe state, and take over control when neces-
sary. While this architecture can provide added safety assurances, inter-
mittent and frequent switching between the trained policy and the safety
controller can result in undesirable behaviors and reduced performance.
We propose to reduce or even eliminate control switching by ‘repairing’
the trained policy based on runtime data produced by the safety con-
troller in a way that deviates minimally from the original policy. The key
idea behind our approach is the formulation of a trajectory optimization
problem that allows the joint reasoning of policy update and safety con-
straints. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach is effective
even when the system model in the safety controller is unknown and only
approximated.
1 Introduction
Data-driven methods such as imitation learning have been successful in learning
control policies for complex control tasks [4, 10]. A major shortcoming that im-
pedes their widespread usage in the field is that the learnt policies typically do
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not come with any safety guarantee. It has been observed that when encounter-
ing states not seen in training, the learnt policy can produce unsafe behaviors
[3, 32].
A common approach to mitigate the safety problem at runtime is to pair
the learning-based controller1 (LC) with a high-assurance safety controller (SC)
that can take over control in safety-critical situations, such as the Simplex ar-
chitecture first proposed in [37]. The safety controller is tasked with predicting
an impending safety violation and taking over control when it deems necessary.
Such controllers are often designed based on conservative models, has inferior
performance compared to its learning-based counterpart, and may require sig-
nificant computation resources if implemented online (e.g. model predictive
control). Moreover, frequent and intermittent switching between the controllers
can result in undesirable behaviors and further performance loss.
In this paper, we propose to leverage the runtime interventions carried out
by the safety controller to repair the learnt policy. We do not assume access
to the original training data of the LC but we assume that the policy is pa-
rameterized, differentiable and given as a white-box. This means that while
fine-tuning the LC from scratch is not possible, it is still possible to improve the
controller based on new data that is gathered during deployment. In particular,
we introduce the concept of policy repair which uses the outputs of the safety
controller to synthesize new training data to fine-tune the LC for improved
safety. Furthermore, we formalize a notion of minimal deviation with respect
to the original policy in order to mitigate the issue of performance degradation
during policy repair. The main idea in minimally deviating policy repair is the
formulation of a trajectory optimization problem that allows us to simultane-
ously reason about policy optimization and safety constraints. A key novelty of
this approach is the synthesis of new safe ‘demonstrations’ that are the most
likely to be produced by the original unsafe learnt policy. In short, we make the
following contributions.
− We formalize the problems of policy repair and minimally deviating policy
repair for improving the safety of learnt control policies.
− We develop a novel algorithm to solve the policy repair problem by it-
eratively synthesizing new training data from interventions by the safety
controller to fine-tune the learnt policy.
− We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach on case studies including
a simulated driving scenario where the true dynamics of the system is
unknown and is only approximated.
1We use the terms ‘controller’ and ‘control policy’ (or simply ‘policy’) interchangeably in
this paper. The latter is more common in the machine learning literature.
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2 Related Work
Model-based control is a well-studied technique for controlling dynamical
systems based on the modelling of the system dynamics. Algorithms such as it-
erative Linear Quadratic Regulator (iLQR) [38] have achieved good performance
even in complex robotic control tasks. One important advantage of model-based
control is its ability to cope with constraints on the dynamics, controls and
states. Constrained Model Predictive Control [18] has been studied extensively
and proven to be successful in solving collision avoidance problems [5, 6] as
well as meeting complex high-level specifications [11]. In this paper, we utilize
model-based control techniques to verify the existence of safe control as well as
synthesize new training data to guide the policy learning.
Imitation learning provides a way of transferring skills for a complex task
from a (human) expert to a learning agent [23]. It has been shown that data-
driven methods such as behavior cloning are effective in handling robotics and
autonomous driving tasks [30, 33] when an expert policy is accessible at training
time. Model-based control techniques have already been introduced to imitation
learning to guide the policy learning process [14, 13, 24, 26]. Our work shares
similarity with [27] in using a model predictive controller to generate training
examples. What distinguishes our work from theirs is that in [27] the model
predictive controller operates based on a given cost function whereas in our
work we do not assume we know any cost function. An outstanding challenge in
the imitation learning area is the lack of safety assurance during both training
and final deployment. Efforts on addressing this challenge include [40, 20],
where multiple machine learning models cooperate to achieve performance and
safety goals. However, the learned models cannot not provide guarantees on
runtime safety by themselves. In fact, even when the dynamical model is given,
existing imitation learning algorithms lack the means to incorporate explicit
safety requirements. In this paper, we use imitation learning to formulate the
problem of minimally deviating policy repair such that a repaired policy can
match the performance of the original learnt policy while being safe.
Safe Learning research has experienced rapid growth in recent years. Many
approaches consider safety requirement as constraints in the learning process.
For example, [1, 9] encodes safety as auxiliary costs under the framework of
Constrained Markov Decision Processes (CMDPs). However, the constraints
can only be enforced approximately. [9] developed a Lyapunov-based approach
to learn safe control policies in CMDPs but is not applicable to parameterized
policy and continuous control actions. Formal methods have also been applied
to certain learning algorithms for establishing formal safety guarantees. In [41],
safety is explicitly defined in probabilistic computational tree logic and a proba-
bilistic model checker is used to check whether any intermediately learned policy
meets the specification. If the specification is violated, then a counterexample
in the form of a set of traces is used to guide the learning process. Provid-
ing assurance for runtime safety of learning-based controller has also garnered
attention recently. [15] combines offline verification of system models with run-
time validation of system executions. In [2], a so-called shield is synthesized
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to filter out unsafe outputs from a reinforcement learning (RL) agent. It also
promotes safe actions by modifying the rewards. A similar idea can be seen
in [28] where a so-called neural simplex architecture is proposed and an online
training scheme is used to improve the safety of RL agents by rewarding safe
actions. However, in the context of RL, choosing the right reward is in general a
difficult task, since incorrect choices often lead to sub-optimal or even incorrect
solutions. In [8], a model predictive approach is proposed to solve for minimum
perturbation to bend the outputs of an RL policy towards asymptotic safety
enforced by a predefined control barrier certificate. A similar idea also appears
in [39] where robust model predictive control is used to minimally perturb the
trajectories of a learning-based controller towards an iteratively expanding safe
target set. Our method differs from [8, 39] as we improve the runtime safety of
the learning-based control while preserving its performance from an imitation
learning perspective.
3 Preliminaries
In this paper we consider a discrete-time control system (X,U, f, d0) where X
is the set of states of the system and U is the set of control actions. The
function f : X × U → X is the dynamical model describing how the state
evolves when an control action is applied, and d0 : X → R is the distribution
of the initial states. By applying control actions sequentially, a trajectory, or a
trace, τ = {(xt, ut)|t = 0, 1, . . .} can be obtained where xt, ut are the state and
control action at time t. In typical optimal control problems, a cost function
c : X × U → R is explicitly defined to specify the cost of performing control
action u ∈ U in state x ∈ X. The cumulative cost along a trajectory τ can
be calculated as
∑
(xt,ut)∈τ
c(xt, ut). An optimal control strategy is thus one that
minimizes the cumulative cost.
Model Predictive Control (MPC) leverages a predictive model of the
system to find a sequence of optimal control actions in a receding horizon fash-
ion. It solves the optimal sequence of control actions for T steps as in (1) but
only applies the first control action and propagates one step forward to the next
state. Then it solves for a new sequence of optimal control actions in the next
state.
arg min
x0:T ,u0:T
T∑
t=0
c(xt, ut) (1)
s.t. xt+1 = f(xt, ut) t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T (2)
When the dynamics f in constraint (2) is nonlinear, the iterative Linear
Quadratic Regulator (iLQR) algorithm [17] applies a local linearization of f
along an existing trajectory which is called the nominal trajectory. It computes a
feedback control law via LQR [16], which induces a locally optimal perturbation
upon the nominal trajectory to reduce the cumulative cost. Formally, given a
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nominal trajectory {(x0, u0), ..., (xT , uT )}, perturbations can be added to each
state and control action in this trajectory, i.e. xt → xt+δxt, ut → ut+δut. The
relationship between δxt, δut and δxt+1 is locally determined by the dynamics
as well as the state and control actions in the nominal trajectory as in (4)
where ∇xf(xt, ut),∇uf(xt, ut) are the partial derivatives of f(xt, ut) w.r.t x, u.
Meanwhile, based on the nominal trajectory,
∑T
t=0 c(xt, ut) in the objective (1)
is substituted by
∑T
t=0 c(δxt+xt, δut+ut)−c(xt, ut) while the decision variables
become δx0:T , δu0:T . When adopting an online trajectory optimization strategy
[38], the optimal control law has a closed form solution δut = kt + Ktδxt in
which kt,Kt are determined by the dynamics and the cumulative cost along the
nominal trajectory.
xt+1 = f(xt, ut) xt+1 + δxt+1 = f(xt + δxt, ut + δut) (3)
δxTt+1 ≈ δxTt ∇xf(xt, ut) + δuTt ∇uf(xt, ut) (4)
A control policy in general is a function pi : X → U that specifies the
behavior of a controller in each state. Given a deterministic policy pi, its trajec-
tory can be obtained by sequentially applying control actions according to the
outputs of pi. Specifically, for an LC such as a deep neural network, the policy is
usually parameterized and can be written as piθ where the parameter θ belongs
to some parameter set Θ (e.g. weights of a neural network). We assume that
piθ(x) is differentiable both in x and θ .
Imitation learning assumes that an expert policy piE (e.g. a human ex-
pert) can demonstrate on how to finish a desired task with high performance.
The learning objective for an agent is to find a policy pi that matches the per-
formance of piE in the same task. Traditional approaches such as behavioral
cloning consider the 0-1 error e(xt, piE ;pi) = I{pi(x) 6= piE(x)} where I is an
indicator function. In this setting, an optimally imitating policy minimizes
Ex∼dpiE [e(x, piE ;pi)] where dpiE is state visitation distribution of piE . From an-
other perspective, the difference between pi and piE can be estimated based on
their trajectory distributions. When the trajectory distribution Prob(τ |piE) is
known, one can empirically estimate and minimize the KL divergenceDKL[piE ||pi]
by regarding Prob(τ |pi) as the probability of pi generating trajectory τ under
an additional Gaussian noise, i.e. ut ∼ N (pi(xt),Σ),∀(xt, ut) ∈ τ . On the
other hand, one can estimate and minimize the KL divergence DKL[pi||piE ]
by treating Prob(τ |pi) as being induced from a Dirac delta distribution ut ∼
δ(pi(xt)) ∀(xt, ut) ∈ τ . Both KL-divergences are related to negative log-
likelihoods.
4 Runtime Safety Assurance
In this section we discuss the runtime safety issues of LCs and introduce our
basic strategy for safe control. We consider a runtime safety requirement Φ for
finite horizon T , such as ‘if the current state is safe at step t, do not reach any
unsafe state within the next T steps’. Temporal logic can be used to formally
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capture this type of safety requirements [19, 29]. Given an LC with a determin-
istic policy piθ , if piθ satisfies Φ globally, that is, at each time step along all its
trajectories, we denote it as piθ |= Φ; otherwise piθ 6|= Φ.
We assume that for any satisfiable Φ, there exists an SC, which we represent
as pisafe, that checks at runtime whether Φ is satisfiable if the output uˆ = piθ(x)
of the LC is directly applied. That is, whether there exists a sequence of control
actions in the next T − 1 steps such that Φ is not violated. If true, then the
final output pisafe(x, piθ(x)) = uˆ. Otherwise it overrides the LC’s output with
pisafe(x, piθ(x)) 6= uˆ. We formally define the SC below.
Definition 1. Given a safety requirement Φ, the corresponding SC is a mapping
pisafe from X × U to U . In each state x ∈ X, pisafe(x, piθ(x)) = piθ(x) iff Φ is
satisfiable after applying the control action piθ(x); otherwise, pi
safe intervenes
by providing a substitute pisafe(x, piθ(x)) 6= piθ(x) to satisfy Φ.
We use 〈piθ, pisafe〉 to represent the LC and SC pair. Obviously the trajec-
tories generated by this pair satisfy Φ everywhere if pisafe exists. There are
multiple options of implementing the SC such as having a backup human safety
driver or using automated reasoning. Depending on the safety requirement and
task environment, the difficulty of implementing safe control varies. In this
paper, we assume that a dynamical model of f is given, possibly constructed
conservatively, and adopt a scheme known as Model Predictive Safe Control as
detailed below.
4.1 Model Predictive Safe Control
This scheme exploits the dynamical model to predict safety in the future. De-
pending on the safety requirement Φ considered, a function ϕ : X → R can
be defined to quantify how safe any state x is, i.e. if ϕ(x) ≤ 0, then x is
safe; otherwise x is unsafe. Without loss of generality, we let the current step
be t = 0. Then the safety requirement can be translated into the constraints
∀t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}, ϕ(xt) ≤ 0. After the LC provides a candidate control output
u0 = piθ(x0), the SC first verifies the satisfiability of (7) by using an MPC-like
formulation as (5) ∼ (8).
min
x0:T ,u0:T
0 (5)
s.t. xt+1 = f(xt, ut) t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T − 1 (6)
ϕ(xt) ≤ 0 t = 1, 2, . . . , T (7)
u0 = piθ(x0) (8)
The formula differs from MPC in that it solves a feasibility problem to check
the existence of a sequence of control actions satisfying the constraints. It is
easier to solve than optimal control since optimality is not required here. If
this problem is feasible, that is, (6) ∼ (8) can be satisfied at the same time.
Then piθ(x0) is deemed safe and the final output is pi
safe(x0, piθ(x0)) = piθ(x0).
Otherwise, the SC solves another feasibility problem which is the same as (5) ∼
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(7) and has (8) removed because the unsafe candidate control action piθ(x0) is
to be substituted. Note that it is possible that (7) is unsatisfiable, in which case
there is no feasible solution. This means a safety violation is inevitable based
on the given model, but the SC can predict such outcome T steps in advance
and more drastic actions (e.g. physically changing the model) may be applied
to prevent an accident from occurring. If a feasible solution to (5) ∼ (7) can
be obtained, we let pisafe(x0, piθ(x0)) = u0 and use this solved u0 to evolve the
system to the next state.
There have been works on model predictive control of cyber-physical systems
subject to formal specifications in signal temporal logic (STL) and its proba-
bilistic variant [31, 34]. Techniques have been proposed to synthesize safety
constraints from formal specifications to accommodate optimal control of con-
tinuous systems and to reason about safety under uncertainty. In the semantics
of STL, ϕ can be viewed as the negation of the robustness satisfaction value.
In this paper, at the beginning of each time step, before solving the fea-
sibility problem (5) ∼ (8), we forward simulate the policy piθ for T steps. If
the simulated trajectory satisfies the safety constraint (7) already, then there
is no need to query the SC at all. Otherwise, we use the constrained iLQR
approach from [7] to solve the feasibility problem. This approach treats the
simulated trajectory as nominal trajectory and iteratively update the nominal
trajectory. Also, this approach turns the safety constraint (7) into a penalty∑T
t=0 exp(Mtψ(xt)) with sufficiently large {Mt}Tt=0. And the penalty is added
to the objective. By using this approach, even if the feasibility problem cannot
be solved, at least a low-penalty solution can be provided.
Monitoring overhead. Model Predictive Safe Control (MPSC) can provide
assurance for a variety of runtime safety requirements. However, it can be
more expensive to implement in practice compared to an LC due to the need
to repeatedly solve a (nonlinear) optimization online as opposed to performing
inference on a neural network [Wuet al.2019]. Frequently using an SC to both
verify safety and solve safe control at runtime can be computationally taxing for
the entire control system. For instance, say the LC’s inference time is tLC , the
time for solving (5) ∼ (8) is t(1)SC and the time for solving (5) ∼ (7) is t(2)SC . At
each step, forward simulation of the LC for T steps takes at least T ∗tLC time. If
(7) is violated in the forward simulation, the SC would be invoked and the total
overhead will grow to T ∗ tLC + t(1)SC . If the problem based on LC’s candidate
control output is infeasible and the SC is required to intervene with a substitute
control value, then the SC will have to solve another MPC-like problem and the
overhead will grow to T ∗ tLC + t(1)SC + t(2)SC . Thus, it would be more economical
to have an inherently safe LC such that the SC is less triggered. Motivated
by this, we propose to repair the LC so that it becomes safer and requires less
intervention from the SC. In the next section, we formally introduce the policy
repair problem and provide a solution to it.
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5 Policy Repair
Figure 1: Architecture of pairing LC’s policy piθ with an SC pi
safe.
We first give a formal definition of the policy repair problem below.
Definition 2. Given a deterministic policy piθ paired with an SC pi
safe as de-
fined in Definition 1, policy repair is the problem of finding a new policy piθ∗
such that θ∗ = arg min
θ∈Θ
Ex∈X [I{pisafe(x, piθ(x)) = piθ(x)}] where I{·} ∈ {0, 1}
is an indicator function.
Definition 2 implies that a repaired policy generates safe controls most of
the time and thus the SC rarely intervenes. The first idea is to treat controls
generated by the SC as repairs at specific states, and then use this data to repair
the whole policy. A solution based on this idea is described as follows.
5.1 Naive Policy Repair
During the execution of the LC and SC pair 〈piθ, pisafe〉, due to the presence
of the SC, all the generated traces are safe. The basic idea of the naive policy
repair approach is to let the unsafe LC learn from the interventions produced
by the SC. Specifically, we iteratively execute the LC and SC pair to generate
new safe traces. After each iteration, the state-action pairs in all the previously
generated traces are used as training data to update the policy of the LC. We
present the steps in Algorithm 1 and illustrate them with a high-level diagram
in Fig. 1, where Γi is the set of traces of the 〈piθi , pisafe〉 pair at the ith iteration.
We use supervised learning to fine-tune the policy parameter to minimize the
expected error E(x,u)∼∪Γi [e(x, u;piθ)] as in line 9 of Algorithm 1. Note that at
this stage, with a slight abuse of notation, we view Γi as a data set containing
(x, u) pairs. In line 5 ∼ 7, if the SC no longer intervenes, then we have a
high confidence that the current policy is safe. According to the law of large
numbers, this confidence increases with increasing number of sampled traces.
The algorithm also terminates if a maximum iteration number is reached, in
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which case the SC may still intervene and the policy repair is only partially
successful.
Algorithm 1 Naive Policy Repair
1: Input an initial policy piθ0 ;
2: Given an SC pisafe; iteration parameter N > 0; policy parameter set Θ.
3: for iteration i = 0 to N do
4: Run the 〈piθi , pisafe〉 pair to generate a set Γi of trajectories.
5: if ∀(x, u) ∈ Γi, u = piθi(x) then
6: pisafe never intervenes ⇒ piθi |= Φ with high probability.
7: return piθi ,Γi
8: end if
9: θi+1 = arg min
θ∈Θ
E(x,u)∼∪ij=0Γj [e(x, u;piθ)]
10: end for
11: return piθN , ∅
5.2 Analysis of Performance Degradation due to SC In-
tervention
In this section, we analyze the performance degradation due to the application
of safe controls from the SC and use it to motivate the study of better policy
repair strategies. We assume that the initial learnt policy piθ0 is given as a
white-box and its parameter θ0 has already been optimized for the control task.
Inspired from lemma 1 in [35], we analyze the performance degradation of naive
policy repair in a fixed-horizon task with maximum step length H. Recall the
definition of cost function c in Section 3. Without loss of generality, we simplify
it into a function of state, that is, from c(x, u) to c(x) and normalize it to the
range [0, 1]. We use η(pi) = Eτ∼pi[
∑H
t=0 c(xt)] to denote the expected cumulative
cost of following a policy pi from initialization to step H. Define the value
function Vpi(xt) = Ext,ut,xt+1...∼pi[
∑H
l=t c(xl)] as the expected cost accumulated
by following pi after reaching state xt at step t till step H. Define the state-action
value function Qpi(xt, ut) = Ext,xt+1,ut+1...∼pi,ut [
∑H
l=t c(xl)] as the expected cost
accumulated by executing ut in state xt, then following pi henceforth til step H.
We use an advantage function Api(xt, ut) = Qpi(xt, ut)− Vpi(xt) to evaluate the
additional cost incurred by applying control action ut in xt instead of adhering
to pi. Based on the lemma 1 in [35] for infinite-horizon scenario, we have the
equation (9) for any two policies pi, pˆi in finite-horizon scenario.
Eτ∼pˆi[
H∑
t=0
Api(xt, ut)] = Eτ∼pˆi[
H∑
t=0
c(xt) + Vpi(xt+1)− Vpi(xt)]
= Eτ∼pˆi[−Vpi(x0) +
H∑
t=0
c(xt)] = Ex0∼d0 [−Vpi(x0)] + Eτ∼pˆi[
H∑
t=0
c(xt)] = η(pˆi)− η(pi) (9)
Assuming that η(piθ0) is the minimum for the desired task, i.e. piθ0 is the
optimal policy with respect to a cost function c, we bound the additional cost
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η(pisafe)− η(pi) incurred by possible interventions of pisafe.
Theorem 1. Given a 〈piθ0 , pisafe〉 pair, let 1, 2 and 3 be the probability of
〈piθ0 , pisafe〉 generating a H-length trajectory where pisafe(x, piθ0(x)) 6= piθ0(x)
happens in at least one, two and three states respectively. Then, η(pisafe) −
η(piθ0) ≤ 1H + 2(H − 1) + 3(H−1)H2 . (Proof in Appendix)
Proof. Define e(x) ∈ {0, 1} as the probability of the safety controller inter-
vening in state x. Let p<t represent the probability of the safety controller
never intervening before step t. Then we use dt(xt, ut) to represent the prob-
ability of generating xt, ut at step t conditioned on p<t, while using d
′
t(xt, ut)
to represent the probability of generating xt, ut at step t but conditioned on
1 − p<t. Let p>t be the probability of the safety controller never intervening
after step t conditioned on the fact that the safety controller intervenes not only
at step t and also for at least one time before step t. Then obviously 1 =∑H
t=0 p<tE(xt,ut)∼dt [e(xt)], 2 =
∑H
t=1(1 − p<t)E(xt,ut)∼d′t [e(xt)]p>t and 3 ≥
(1−p<t)E(xt,ut)∼d′t [e(xt)](1−p>t) ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,H}. Note that Apiθ0 (xt, ut) =
0 in states where ut = pi
safe(xt, piθ0(xt)) = piθ0(xt) while Apiθ0 (xt, ut) ≥ 0 in
states where ut = pi
safe(xt, piθ0(xt)) 6= piθ0(xt) due to the optimality of piθ0 un-
der the current cost function c. In addition, Apiθ0 (xt, ut) ≤ (H − t)(maxx∈X c(x)−
min
x∈X
c(x)) = H− t for all xt ∈ X, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,H}. Then we use those facts and
assumptions to derive the theorem as below based on (9).
η(pisafe)
= η(piθ0) + Eτ∼pisafe [
H∑
t=0
Apiθ0 (xt, ut)]
= η(piθ0) +
H∑
t=0
Ext,ut∼pisafe [e(xt)Apiθ0 (xt, ut)]
= η(piθ0) +
H∑
t=0
p<tExt,ut∼dt [e(xt)Apiθ0 (xt, ut)] +
H∑
t=1
(1− p<t)Ext,ut∼d′t [e(xt)Apiθ0 (xt, ut)]p>t
+
H−1∑
t=1
(1− p<t)Ext,ut∼d′t [e(xt)Apiθ0 (xt, ut)](1− p>t)
≤ η(piθ0) +
H∑
t=0
p<tExt,ut∼dt [e(xt)(H − t)] +
H∑
t=1
(1− p<t)Ext,ut∼d′t [e(xt)(H − t)p>t]
+
H−1∑
t=1
(H − t)3
≤ η(piθ0) +H
H∑
t=0
p<tExt,ut∼dt [e(xt)] + (H − 1)
H∑
t=1
(1− p<t)Ext,ut∼d′t [e(xt)p>t] +
H−1∑
t=1
(H − t)3
≤ η(piθ0) + 1H + 2(H − 1) +
3(H − 1)H
2
(10)
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The theorem shows the additional cost can grow quadratically in H when
the probability of multiple interventions from the SC becomes higher. The im-
plication of this is that even if the repaired policy piθ∗ replicates pi
safe with zero
error, the repaired policy can still suffer from significant performance degra-
dation. Since the training error is non-zero in practice, piθ∗(x) 6= piθ0(x) may
happen in more states where pisafe(x, piθ0(x)) 6= piθ0(x). One major challenge in
mitigating this performance loss is that the training information of piθ0 , espe-
cially the cost function c, could be unknown. In the next section, we describe
our approach of repairing a policy so that it also minimally deviates from the
original one.
5.3 Minimally Deviating Policy Repair via Trajectory Syn-
thesis
We firstly formally define the minimally deviating policy repair problem.
Definition 3. Given an initial policy piθ0 and an SC pi
safe as defined in Def-
inition 1, minimally deviating policy repair is the problem of finding a
policy piθ∗ where θ
∗ = arg min
θ∈Θ
Ex∼dpiθ [e(x, piθ0 ;piθ)] subject to pi
safe(x, piθ(x)) =
piθ(x),∀x ∈ X.
Informally, the objective of this repair problem is to reduce the chance of
piθ∗(x) 6= piθ0(x) while maintaining the safety of piθ∗ . Observe that the error
term e(·) in Definition 3 resembles the one in an imitation learning setting.
Then minimizing the expected error can be viewed as imitating piθ0 . On the
other hand, the equality constraint in Definition 3 can be understood as requir-
ing piθ∗ to satisfy (7) at all steps in all its trajectories. Hence, the minimally
deviating policy repair is essentially a problem of optimizing an imitation learn-
ing objective with safety constraints. The major challenge is that, the decision
variable for the imitation learning objective is the policy parameter θ while for
safety constraints (7) it is the state x.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2: (a) The grey area is the lane. The green dashed curve is the
trajectory of the vehicle. (b) The red dashed curve is the trajectory of the
initial policy. (c) The blue dashed curve is the trajectory of the policy and
safety controller pair. (d) The magenta dashed curve is the trajectory produced
by the repair policy that deviates minimally from the original one.
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We use a simple example below to illustrate our problem setting and desired
solution. Consider a policy that was trained to steer a vehicle around a specific
corner as shown in Fig. 2(a). When deployed in a slightly different environment
as shown in Fig. 2(b), the policy fails to keep the vehicle inside the lane. Fig. 2(c)
illustrates that with the basic simplex setup as shown in Fig. 1, although the
safety controller manages to keep the vehicle inside the lane, frequent switching
between the two controllers can lead to undesirable behaviors such as an oscil-
lating trajectory. Fig. 2(d) shows a more desirable trajectory produced by a new
policy trained using minimally deviating policy repair. Our approach to the
problem stated in Definition 3 is to ‘imitate’ the original policy by first synthe-
sizing and then learning from new trajectories that are similar to ones produced
by the original policy but instead do not violate the safety requirements. The
synthesis algorithm works by iteratively improving the trajectories produced by
a naively repaired policy such as the one in Fig. 2(c) until trajectories such as
the one in Fig. 2(d) are obtained. The improvement is achieved by solving a
trajectory optimization problem of which the objective is transformed from the
imitation learning objective in Definition 3. We mainly focus on showing such
transformation in the rest of this section.
As mentioned in Section 3, to solve an imitation learning problem, we can
minimize the KL-divergence which is related to maximal log-likelihood, i.e.
arg min
θ∈Θ
DKL[piθ||piθ0 ] = arg max
θ∈Θ
Eτ∼piθ [logProb(τ |piθ0)]. Note that Prob(τ |piθ)
is induced from a Dirac Delta distribution u ∼ δ(pi(x)) and Prob(τ |piθ0) is car-
ried out by adding to piθ0 an isotropic Gaussian noise N (0,Σ) with diagonal
Σ = σ2I. When a finite set Γ of trajectories of piθ is obtained, the log-likelihood
is equivalent to (11).
Eτ∼piθ [logProb(τ |piθ0)] ≈
1
|Γ|
∑
τ∈Γ
logProb(τ |piθ0)
∝
∑
τ∈Γ
log{
∏
(xt,ut)∈τ
exp[− (piθ(xt)− piθ0(xt))
TΣ−1(pi(xt, θ)− piθ0(xt))
2
]}
∝ −1
2
∑
τ∈Γ
∑
(xt,ut)∈τ
||piθ(xt)− piθ0(xt)||22 (11)
Suppose that at iteration i ≥ 1, a safe policy piθi is obtained and executed
to generate a set Γi of safe traces. Define lxt,piθi =
1
2 ||piθ0(xt) − piθi(xt)||22 and
JΓi(piθi) =
∑
τ∈Γi
∑
(xt,ut)∈τ lxt,piθi . To decrease JΓi , a new policy parameter
θi+1 = θi + δθi can be obtained by solving δθi = arg min
δθ
JΓi(piθi+δθ)− JΓi(piθ).
We further use the Gauss-Newton step [22] to expand this as shown in (12)
below.
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arg min
δθ
δθT∇θJΓi(piθi) +
1
2
δθT∇θJΓi(piθi)∇θJΓi(piθi)T δθ
= arg min
δθ
∑
τ∈Γi
∑
(xt,ut)∈τ
δθi∇θpiθi(xt)∇piθi lxt,piθi
+
1
2
δθTi ∇θpiθi(xt)∇piθi lxt,piθi∇piθi lTxt,piθi∇θpiθi(xt)
T δθi (12)
We note that the changes of the policy control output ut = piθi(xt) at arbi-
trary state xt can be locally linearized as from (13) to (14).
ut + δut = piθi+δθi(xt + δxt) ut = piθi(xt) (13)
δuTt − δxTt ∇xpiθi(xt) ≈ δθTi ∇θpiθi(xt) (14)
It implies that due to δθi, each trajectory τ = {(x0, u0), (x1, u1), . . .} of piθi
is approximately perturbed by δτ = {(δx0, δu0), (δx1, δu1), . . .}. Motivated by
the fact that piθi+δθi is safe if all of the trajectories are still safe after such
perturbations, we optimize w.r.t the trajectory perturbations δτ ’s instead of
δθi by exploiting the relation between each (δxt, δut) ∈ δτ and δθi as in (14).
Interpolating the RHS of (14) in (12), we obtain a trajectory optimization prob-
lem (15) with linear and quadratic costs as shown in (16) ∼ (20). Note that
this trajectory optimization problem treats the trajectories from Γi as nominal
trajectories and solves for optimal perturbations to update those nominal tra-
jectories. Local linearization is used to derive the dynamics constraints as in
(21) for each noiminal trajectory. By adding the safety constraints (22), the
trajectories can remain safe after adding the solved perturbations. Here, we use
the constrained iLQR approach from [7] to resolve this constrained trajectory
optimization problem.
arg min
{δx0:H ,δu0:H}
1
4|Γi|
∑
τ∈Γi
∑
(xt,ut)∈τ
 1δxt
δut
T  0 QTx QTuQx Qxx Qxu
Qu Q
T
xu Quu
 1δxt
δut
 (15)
where Qx = −2∇xpiθi(xt)∇piθi lxt,piθi (16)
Qu = 2∇piθi lxt,piθi (17)
Qxx = ∇xpiθi(xt)∇piθi lxt,piθi∇piθi lTxt,piθi∇xpiθi(xt)
T (18)
Qxu = ∇xpiθi(xt)∇piθi lxt,piθi∇piθi lTxt,piθi (19)
Quu = ∇piθi lxt,piθi∇piθi lTxt,piθi (20)
s.t. δxTt+1 = δx
T
t ∇xf(xt, ut) + δuTt ∇uf(xt, ut) t = 0, 1, . . . ,H − 1 (21)
ϕ(xt + δxt) ≤ 0 t = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,H (22)
One major benefit of this formulation is that imitation learning objective
and safety constraints can be reasoned at the same time via optimal control.
As the optimization is now separable, (15) ∼ (21) provide a lower bound for
(12). By solving the linear equations (14), δθi can be inferred from the solved
perturbations {δx0:H , δu0:H}, and then be used to modify θi. Alternatively,
piθi+δθi can be obtained by training piθi with the trajectories induced from
{x1:H + δx1:H , u1:H + δu1:H}.
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The key steps of this iterative approach are shown in Fig.3 and the details
are in Algorithm 2. As indicated by line 2 and 6, Algorithm 1 is used to find
safe policies and generate safe nominal trajectories. This is because safe nominal
trajectories guarantee that the trajectory optimization problem (15) ∼ (22) has
feasible solutions, e.g. δx = 0, δu = 0. We terminate Algorithm 2 if Algorithm
1 fails to output a set of safe trajectories. In each iteration, we solve for the
trajectory perturbations in line 4 and use them to update the policy as shown
in line 5. The algorithm ends in line 7 if the trajectory optimization step no
longer helps in decreasing the deviation.
Figure 3: Key steps in our minimally deviating policy repair algorithm. piθ0
refers to the initial, learnt policy.
Algorithm 2 Policy Repair for Minimal Deviation
1: Given an initial learnt policy piθ0 ; iteration parameters  ∈ [0, 1], N > 1.
2: Initialization Obtain piθ1 ,Γ1 from Naive Policy Repair(piθ0) via Algo-
rithm 1;
if Γ1 is ∅, then return fail
3: for iteration i = 1 to i = N do
4: Solve the optimal {δx0:H , δu0:H} from (15) ∼ (22).
5: Solve δθi via (14) and let θi+1 = θi + δθi.
Alternatively, search for θi+1 = arg min
θ∈Θ
E(x,u)∼Γi [e(x+ δx, u+ δu;piθ)] by
training piθi with {(x+ δx, u+ δu)|(x, u) ∈ Γi}.
6: Obtain piθi+1 ,Γi+1 from Naive Policy Repair(piθi+1) via Algorithm 1;
if Γi+1 is ∅, then return piθi
7: if |JΓi+1(piθi+1)− JΓi(piθi)| ≤ , then return piθi+1
8: end for
9: return piθN
Complexity analysis. The major time complexity of Algorithm 2 will
be accounted for by solving the quadratic programming (QP) in (15) ∼ (22).
Since the cost (15) is convex as indicated by (11), if the constraint (22) is also
convex, the complexity of solving such QP can be polynomial [21]; otherwise,
it can be NP-hard [25]. The trajectory optimization in line 4 needs to be
solved only once off-line at the beginning of each iteration based on the safe
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trajectories collected from previous iteration. In our experiments, the trajectory
optimization is solved in a receding horizon manner as an MPC. In this case, the
QP will be solved repeatedly over time to determine an appropriate sequence of
control outputs. The nominal trajectories are obtained at each step by forward
simulating the policy for a few steps ahead. The total time budget will be
the same as the standard MPC. Besides the trajectory optimization, the time
complexity of policy updating in line 5 is either the same as that of solving an
approximated linear equation (14) or training a neural network in a standard
supervised manner.
6 Experiments
We perform two case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed ap-
proach. The key metrics of evaluation are (1) safety of the repaired policy and
(2) performance preservation with respect to the original policy.
6.1 Mountaincar
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 4: (a) The mountaincar environment. (b) The red patterns represent a
set of trajectories produced by executing the initial policy. The y-axis indicates
the velocity and the x-axis indicates the horizontal position of the car. The car
reaches the right mountain top in 83.8 steps on average with velocity higher
than the safety threshold (0.02). (c) The interventions by the SC are indicated
by the blue dots. A naively repaired policy takes the 89.3 steps on average to
reach the mountaintop. (d) A minimally deviating repaired policy accomplishes
the same task in 84.9 steps on average without violating the safety requirement.
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Our first case study is Mountaincar2, as shown in Fig.4(a). In this environ-
ment, the goal is to push an under-powered car from the bottom of a valley to
the mountain top on the right with as few steps as possible. The state x = [p, v]
includes the horizontal position p ∈ [−1.2, 0.6] and the velocity v ∈ [−0.07, 0.07]
of the car. The control u ∈ [−1.0, 1.0] is the force to be applied to the car.
The car has a discrete-time dynamics that can be found in the source code
the simulator. For the LC, we train a neural network policy via the Proximal
Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm [36]. The neural network takes the state
variables as input and generates a distribution over the action space. An addi-
tional layer is added at the end of the network to calculate the expected action.
In Fig.4(b) ∼ (d), the x and y axes indicate the horizontal position and the
velocity respectively. The car starts from a state randomly positioned within
[−0.6,−0.4] as indicated by the black line above ‘init’. The step length for the
PPO-trained policy to reach the mountain top (p ≥ 0.45) is 83.8 averaged over
1000 runs.
Now consider the safety requirement ‘velocity v should not exceed 0.02 when
reaching the mountain top at p ≥ 0.45’ . The goal states and unsafe states are
indicated by the green and grey areas in Fig.4(b). It can be observed that the
PPO-trained policy does not satisfy this requirement as all the red trajectories
in Fig.4(b) end up at p = 0.45 with v > 0.02. Then an SC is implemented by
following the Model Predictive Safe Control scheme introduced in Section 4.1.
The function ϕ(x) in (7) evaluates whether the state x is in the grey unsafe
area. The LC and SC pair generates the red trajectories in Fig.4(c). The blue
dots indicate the intervention of the SC. While implementing Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2, in each iteration we collect 20 trajectories in the trajectory set Γi.
Algorithm 1 produces a naively repaired policy that can reach the green area
with 89.3 steps on average. When using the minimally deviating policy repair
algorithm (Algorithm 2), the resulting policy produces the red trajectories in
Fig.4(d). It shows that in all the runs the resulting policy satisfies the safety
requirement and in addition the SC does not intervene. In terms of performance,
the policy reaches the green area with only 84.9 steps on average, which is much
closer to the performance of the original policy.
6.2 Traction-Loss Event in Simulated Urban Driving En-
vironment
In this experiment, we show that our approach is effective even with an approxi-
mate dynamical model. The environment is in an open urban driving simulator,
CARLA [12], with a single ego car on an empty road. The state variables in-
clude position, velocity and yaw angle of the car and the control variables include
acceleration and steering angles. We use a simple bicycle model from [7] to ap-
proximate the unknown dynamical model of the car. The model simulates a
discrete-time system where the control actions are supplied to the system at an
interval of 0.03s. For the LC, an initial neural network policy is trained with
2https://gym.openai.com/envs/MountainCarContinuous-v0/
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data collected from manually driving the car on different empty roads while
maintaining a speed of 8m/s and keeping the car to the middle of the lane.
During testing, we put the vehicle in a roundabout as shown in Fig.5(a) where
the white curves are the lane boundary. The starting and finishing lines are
fixed. The safety requirement can be described informally as ‘once the vehicle
crosses outside a lane boundary, the controller should drive the vehicle back to
the original lane within 5 seconds’.
(a) (b) (c)
(d)
(e) (f)
Figure 5: The green trajectories represent normal trajectories of the car when
there is no traction loss. The occurrence of the traction-loss event is indicated
by the yellow rectangle. (a)Red trajectory: the initial policy fails to correct
itself from skidding. (b) With interventions by the SC (the blue segment), the
vehicle manages to return to the lane. (c) Magenta trajectory: policy repaired
via Algorithm 2 corrects itself from skidding and does so better than using the
SC. (d) The Y-axis represents velocity of the car and the X-axis represents time
steps. The red curve indicates that the initial policy is in control and the blue
segments represents the interventions from the SC. The cyan curve is generated
by a policy repaired via Algorithm 1. The magenta curve is generated by a
minimally deviating policy repaired via Algorithm 2. (e) Cyan trajectory: after
the traction-loss area is removed, the naively repaired policy drives the vehicle
towards the center of the roundabout, crosses the inner lane boundary for a
short time and then returns onto the lane. (f) Magenta trajectory: after the
traction-loss area is removed, by using Algorithm 2, the vehicle adheres to the
mid of the lane.
The initial, learnt policy drives the car well in the roundabout, as shown
in Fig.5(a). We then consider an unforeseen traction-loss event, as shown by
the yellow rectangle in Fig.5(a) where the friction is reduced to 0 (e.g. an
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icy surface). As a result, the vehicle skids out of the outer lane boundary.
The initial policy alone does not satisfy the safety requirement, as it keeps
driving the vehicle outside the lane boundary after the traction-loss event, as
shown by the red trajectory in Fig.5(a). An SC is implemented by following the
Model Predictive Safe Control scheme introduced in Section 4.1. The function
ϕ(x) in (7) checks whether the distance between the vehicle and the middle of
the lane is larger than half of the lane width. In Fig.5(b), the blue segment
indicates the interventions of the SC. It shows that due to the coupling of the
LC and SC, the vehicle satisfies the safety requirement as it moves back to the
lane.When Algorithm 1 and 2 are executed, the parameter  is set to 0.001.
For every intermediate policy in each iteration, 10 trajectories are collected in
its trajectory set Γ.It takes 5 iterations for Algorithm 1 to synthesize a safe
policy that does not require the SC to intervene. Starting with this safe policy,
Algorithm 2 runs for 25 iterations before termination. The magenta trajectory
in Fig.5(c) is from the minimally deviating policy repaired via Algorithm 2.
Obviously the policy is able to correct itself without any intervention from the
SC. In Fig.5(d), we compare the velocities of the vehicles controlled by different
policies. It can be observed that the velocities of all policies drop drastically
due to traction-loss at around step 220. The minimally deviating repaired policy
performs the best in restoring the velocity back to 8m/s. It is worth noting that
velocity stability is important from the viewpoint of passenger comfort.
We summarize the results in Table.1. The performances of the algorithms
are evaluated from multiple aspects. We evaluate how well the task is finished
from 1) average speed at each step (the closer to the targeted speed 8m/s the
better); 2) average distance from the vehicle to the middle of the lane at each
step (the smaller the better); 3) total number of steps that the vehicle outputs
control actions in one run (the fewer the better). We evaluate the smoothness
of the trajectories based on the variances of the speeds and distances in time
series as well as the standard deviations of the speed and distance changes
between consecutive steps, which can be regarded as an approximation of their
derivatives over time. Smooth steering should induce low variances and standard
deviations. It is shown that before the traction-loss area is placed, the initial
policy drives the vehicle at 8m/s on average and keeps the vehicle close to the
middle of the lane. Its low variances and standard deviations can be viewed as
a baseline of the trajectory smoothness. After the traction-loss event occurs,
the initial policy still maintains the speed but the car slides out of the lane as
indicated by the average distance. The initial policy and SC pair has the lowest
average and lowest speed. As a result, the total running steps increases. Its
increased variances and the standard deviations signify that its steering gets
less smooth. In terms of policy repair, both Algorithm 1 and 2 are successful in
finding safe policies. The policy repaired via Algorithm 1 behaves similar to the
initial policy and SC pair – the vehicle experiences significant speed changes and
takes longer to finish the driving task. The minimally deviating policy repaired
via Algorithm 2 behaves similarly to the initial policy in terms of maintaining the
targeted speed, staying close to the middle of the lane while producing a smooth
trajectory. In summary, the repaired policy from Algorithm 2 outperforms the
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Avg.
Speed(m/s)
Lowest
Speed(m/s)
Avg.
Distance(m)
Tot. Steps
(0.03s/step)
Initial Policy (No
Traction-Loss
Event)
8.0 7.1 0.27 396
Initial Policy 8.0 5.2 1.7 420
Initial Policy w/ SC 7.1 1.2 0.81 454
Algorithm 1 7.5 2.4 1.1 440
Algorithm 2 7.9 5.2 0.63 413
Var. Speed
Std. Speed
Change
Var.
Distance
Std.
Distance
Change
Initial Policy (No
Traction-Loss
Event)
0.53 0.074 0.10 0.0096
Initial Policy 0.79 0.16 4.4 0.026
Initial Policy w/ SC 2.1 0.17 1.0 0.033
Algorithm 1 2.4 0.17 1.4 0.042
Algorithm 2 0.73 0.15 1.0 0.033
Table 1: Avg. Speed: average speed of the vehicle in each run. Lowest Speed:
the lowest speed since the vehicle firstly reaches 8m/s in each run. Aveg. Dis-
tance: the average distance between the vehicle and the middle of the lane at
each step. Tot. Steps: the total number of steps that the vehicle outputs con-
trol actions in one run. Var. Speed: the variance of the speed at each step
in each run. Std. Speed Change: the standard deviation of the speed changes
between consecutive steps. Var. Distance: the variance of the distance between
the vehicle and the middle of the lane at each step. Std. Distance Change:
the standard deviation of the distance (from vehicle to the middle of the lane)
changes between consecutive steps. Initial policy is tested before and after the
traction-loss area is placed. The initial policy and SC pair is tested after the
traction-loss event occurs. ‘Algorithm 1’ and ‘Algorithm 2’ respectively refer to
the policies repaired via those two algorithms.
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initial policy with SC pair and the repaired policy from Algorithm 1 in almost
all metrics. We also observe that the average time of neural network inference
is 0.0003s while the average time for SC to solve (3) ∼ (8) is 0.39s.
To further measure the impact of policy repair and evaluate the performance
difference between a naive repair (using Algorithm 1) and a minimally deviating
repair (using Algorithm 2), we remove the traction-loss area and execute both
repaired policies in the original environment. It can be observed in Fig.5(e)
that the naively repaired policy cuts inside the lane, since it learns (possibly
due to overfitting) to steer inward in the states where traction loss is supposed
to occur. In contrast, the policy repaired using Algorithm 2 manages to keep
the car in the lane, as it learns to imitate the original policy. This thus further
validates our approach of finding a minimally deviating repair.
7 Conclusion
We consider a Simplex architecture where a learning-based controller is paired
with a backup safety controller for ensuring runtime safety. We show that this
setup, while provides added safety assurance, can produce undesired outputs or
cause significant performance degradation. We propose to address this problem
by fine-tuning the learning-based controller using interventions from the safety
controller, and addressing the issue of performance degradation via imitation
learning. Our experiments indicate that our proposed approach is effective in
achieving both safety and performance even when the dynamical model used by
the safety controller is not exact. In the future, we plan to consider other types
of safety controllers and extend our techniques to end-to-end control.
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